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Can having more education than a job requires reduce one’s chances of being offered the job?  We study 
this question in a sample of applications to jobs that are posted on an urban Chinese website.  We find that 
being overqualified in this way does not reduce the success rates of university-educated jobseekers 
applying to college-level jobs, but that it does hurt college-educated workers’ chances when applying to 
jobs requiring technical school, which involves three fewer years of education than college. Our results 
highlight a difficult situation faced by the recent large cohort of college-educated Chinese workers:  They 
seem to fare poorly in the competition for jobs, both when pitted against more-educated university 
graduates, and when pitted against less-educated technical school graduates.     
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Between 2002 and 2010 the number of college and university graduates entering China’s labor 
market increased more than five-fold, from about 1 million to over 5 million new graduates per year.1  
While China’s demand for highly educated workers has also been increasing, concern has been widely 
expressed regarding how this massive influx of young, highly educated workers will be absorbed by 
China’s labor market.  The prospect of a large number of under- or unemployed young college graduates 
worries many observers.  
While China’s recent expansion of higher education may be unique in its magnitude, the notion 
that workers may experience difficulties getting hired for a job because they have more education than the 
job requires has a long history.  Indeed, the broader problem of overqualification for the available jobs has 
been a widely expressed concern among older jobseekers in the U.S.’s recent “great recession”.2  In this 
paper, we use internet job board micro data to examine the overeducation hypothesis:  are there conditions 
under which having too much education can harm a jobseeker’s prospects of being hired, and do these 
conditions apply to recent university graduates in China?   
Our study contributes to three literatures.  First, our study of the micro-level competition between 
applicants for the same jobs adds to our understanding of the mechanisms via which education expansion 
policies such as China’s affect the overall labor market.   Second, our study provides new information on 
the substitutability between workers with different levels of education, which is a key parameter for a 
number of canonical questions in labor economics, including the effects of immigration and skill 
upgrading on wage structures.3  Finally, we contribute to a small economic literature on overqualification.  
While this literature has studied a number of consequences of overqualification, we are not aware of any 
existing studies of the effects of overqualification on the probability a worker will receive a job offer.    
Our data is from www.xmrc.com.cn, the official internet job board sponsored by the department of 
human resources of Xiamen, one of the major cities in China’s coastal region. For the period from May to 
October 2010, we have detailed information on all the jobs that were posted and all the applications 
workers made to those jobs.  Only about eight percent of the applicants in our sample are contacted by the 
firm after submitting their application; we use receiving such a contact as our measure of jobseeking 
success. In our main analysis, we focus on workers with just two different levels of education: college and 
university; these are the two main forms of postsecondary education in China and require three versus 
four years to complete, respectively.  Our results show, first of all, that university graduates have an 
advantage over college graduates when both types of workers are competing for the same job.  This is true 
both when the job ad requests university education (in which case university graduates have about a two 
percentage point advantage), and when the ad requests only college education (in which case university 
graduates have about a one percentage point advantage over college-educated applicants).  Second, we 
                                                 
1 Statistics are from China Education Statistical Yearbook.  See Section 2 for a more detailed discussion of recent trends in Chinese higher 
education. 
2 See for example Rossheim (2012).   
3 See for example Card (2009). 
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ask whether, ceteris paribus, university-educated candidates are more likely to be contacted by employers 
when applying to college-level jobs (for which they are overqualified) or when applying to jobs that 
match their educational credentials.  Perhaps surprisingly, in contrast to the overeducation hypothesis we 
find that university-educated workers actually receive more employer contacts when applying for college-
level than university-level jobs.  Finally, we show that the above results are driven mostly by Chinese-
owned firms (both private-sector firms and state-owned enterprises).  Foreign-owned firms behave 
differently, in a manner that is more consistent with their job ads.  These firms seem to prefer college-
educated applicants to university-educated applicants when their ad requests a college-educated worker.   
Our paper also studies the overeducation hypothesis at a lower tier of the Chinese labor market:  
the competition between college graduates and technical school graduates, who have three fewer years of 
education than college graduates.  Here our results are very different:  College graduates do, indeed, fare 
quite poorly when they apply to tech-school jobs.  We speculate that this may result from the greater 
education mismatch between these two types of education, including the fact that college grads may lack 
specific vocational skills taught in technical schools.  Together, our results suggest that overqualification 
can reduce the chances of receiving a job offer, but that the effects can vary across levels and types of 
education.  Also, China’s recent college graduates appear to face a relatively difficult situation, 
sandwiched between two groups with whom they do not seem to compete well.   
2. The development of higher education in China 
To put our results on educational expansion and over-education in context, this Section provides a 
brief review of the recent evolution of China’s system of higher education.  The modern school system in 
China was established in the early 20th century.  Until 1949, China’s higher education system mainly 
followed the American model.  After 1949, the central government of the People’s Republic of China 
restructured the higher education system according to the Soviet model. As a result, it became part of the 
centrally planned economy with full public financial support and all graduates were assigned jobs 
according to the government plan. It “became departmentalized, segmented and overspecialized; teaching 
was separated from research” (Bai, 2006). In 1958, China made an attempt to expand its higher education 
which eventually failed together with the Great Leap Forward. After the end of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976), China gradually restored its system of higher education and started to reform the system as 
part of the overall move to a market-oriented socialist economy.  
By the end of 1980s, China’s higher education system suffered from both financial difficulties due 
to fast expansion and rapidly rising costs, as well as inefficient use of recourses. Universities were either 
administrated by the Ministry of Education, or by some specialized national ministries, state-owned 
enterprises, national associations or local education bureaus, local ministries or state-owned enterprises. 
The average size of higher education institutions was less than 2000 students in 1989 and the average 
student/teacher ratio was as low as 5.3:1 in 1988 (Wang 2001). 
As a result of higher education reform in the 1990s and especially the expansion of 1999, smaller 
colleges and universities were merged into bigger ones; local governments and universities themselves 
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started to get more funding as well as administration responsibilities; and students started to pay tuition, 
which for many families in the less-developed regions costs more than their annual income.  Importantly 
for the purposes of this paper, university students now had to search for jobs upon graduation whereas 
before the reform, university graduates were assigned jobs in the government or the state owned 
enterprises.  According to Kang (2000), the official justifications for the 1999 enrollment expansion 
policy were, first, the expected increase in demand for skilled labor in the face of globalization; second, 
the need to stimulate domestic demand and to alleviate the rising urban unemployment problem after the 
1997 Asian crisis; and finally, to achieve “mass higher education”. 
Based on the number of new graduates created, the 1999 enrollment expansion was a stunning 
success.  As Figure 1 shows, the total new admissions of college and university together increased more 
than five-fold by 2009.   Figure 2 shows that between 1986 and 2004 the number of university and college 
graduates were of similar magnitude and increased at similar speed.  Starting from 2005, however, the 
number of college graduates increased faster than university graduates. Starting at the same time, the 
number of technical school graduates also increased dramatically after some previous stagnation. 
Less clear, however, is whether the new graduates have the skills needed for China’s “new” labor 
market, or whether they are getting the types of jobs they expected to be qualified for.  For example, 
Figure 3, which shows time trends in official vacancy statistics, suggests that the demand for college and 
university graduates has not increased as much as the supply.4  Public discussions also seem to suggest an 
emerging shortage of high school and technical school graduates. College and university students, who 
now pay much higher tuition than before, might reasonably demand to see a corresponding return for their 
investment, but this is not always the case:  many universities are still learning to adapt their curriculum to 
market demand with a limited supply of qualified faculty, so graduates’ skills may not match the market’s 
needs.   It can also be difficult for new graduates to take good jobs in regions other than their home region 
due to various administrative restrictions, including the hukou system.  Overall, a number of observers 
have argued that recent university graduates are finding it difficult to get the “good jobs” they have been 
expecting (Lai 2001, Zeng 2004, Yao 2009, and Wang and Zeng 2009).   
3. The literature on overqualification 
In general, overqualification refers to a situation where a worker has more education, or a higher 
level of some other skill or credential, than is required to perform a job.  Measuring overqualification 
therefore requires some indicator of a job’s skill requirements, which can be either taken from third-party 
studies, such as in the U.S. Dictionary of Occupational Titles, or from employers’ statements about what 
                                                 
4 High school, technical school, college and university are the four main education categories in China. Both high school and technical school 
require 12 years of education, but technical school provides specialized training in the last 3 years for students most of whom will enter the 
labor market upon graduation. High school graduates usually will take college entrance exams for higher education upon graduation. Here, 
we use “college” to refer to 3-year higher education and “university” to refer to 4-year higher education. The labor market generally will 
consider these two distinct levels of education in China as will become clear from our empirical analysis. Technical schools in China actually 
can refer to three different types of secondary vocational schools, 1) specialized secondary schools (mostly theoretical courses with some 
practical training), 2) technical schools (mostly practical training with some theoretical courses) and 3) secondary vocational schools (mostly 
regular senior middle school courses with some vocational courses). We do not distinguish these three types of secondary vocational schools 
in our analysis due to data limitations and refer to these as technical schools for ease of understanding. 
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is required or expected.  In this paper we follow most of the literature by taking the latter approach:  we 
will refer to a worker as being overeducated for a particular job if he/she has more education than the 
employer requests in the job ad on XMRC.com.   
Interestingly, none of the existing research on overqualification we are aware of studies whether 
being overqualified can harm a worker’s chances of being offered a job.  Instead, --perhaps because data 
such as ours on the job application and worker recruitment process is so rare—existing literature tends to 
focus on measuring (a) what fraction of workers, and which workers are employed in jobs for which they 
are overqualified, and (b) what happens to those workers (for example, are they more likely to quit their 
current job?). Overviews of this literature can be found in Borghans and Grip (2000) and Hartog (2000).   
More recently, Frenette (2004) examined the incidence, persistence and economic returns to 
overqualification among Canadian post-secondary graduates using panel data. He found that master’s 
graduates are far more likely to be overqualified for their current job than others. McGuinness and Sloane 
(2011) examined both overqualification and over-skilling and suggested that overqualified workers might 
choose their lower-wage jobs for other positive job attributes.  In his study of German data, Buchel (2002) 
finds that overeducated workers are healthier, more strongly work- and career-minded, more likely to 
participate in training, and more stable in their jobs, all of which would justify employers’ willingness to 
hire overeducated workers. Green and Zhu (2010) suggest that a large increase in the supply of university 
graduates can lead to increased dispersion of the returns to graduate education through increased 
overqualification.  In addition to the above, Buchel and Battu (2003) examined the relationship between 
labor market size and gender difference in overqualification using German data; Hersch (1991, 1995) 
suggests that firms might want to hire overqualified workers to save training costs; and Renes and Ridder 
(1995) suggest that firms might use higher qualification requirements to discourage women from applying 
to a job.  
There are also some empirical studies of overeducation using Chinese data.  Using data from the 
Urban Household Survey, Huang, Lu and Fan (2010) estimated that overeducated individuals experience 
a 4.8% wage penalty relative to persons with the same education in jobs that match their qualifications.5  
Li, Chen and Liu (2009) using survey data on university graduates find that individuals who are more 
flexible in job location and more interested in their major are less likely to have education-mismatched 
jobs.  Wu (2007) also shows that the return to education is lower for overeducated workers than 
‘education-matched’ workers. 
In short, while a number of authors have studied overqualification in Chinese and other labor 
markets, existing research seems to focus only on determining how many and which workers are 
employed in jobs they are overqualified for, or on measuring the consequences of being in such a job on 
outcomes such as workers’ happiness and job mobility.  To our knowledge, no one has studied whether 
firms ‘shy away’ from hiring workers who have more educational qualifications than are needed for a job, 
                                                 
5 The overeducation measure used in their work is derived by comparing individual actual earning with the average earnings of one of eight 
general occupation groups. 
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despite the fact that this is often cited by workers as a significant impediment to their job search.  This is 
the question we address here.   
4. Data 
 
The city where we collected our data, Xiamen, is a subtropical coastal city in southern China. It is 
one of the five economic zones established immediately after China’s 1979 economic reforms; thus it is 
highly modernized and integrated into the world economy relative to other Chinese cities.  The economy 
of Xiamen is based mainly on electronics, machinery and chemical engineering; Xiamen contains one of 
Dell Computer’s five global production and service centers.  Table 1 provides some statistics that 
compare Xiamen to other Chinese cities.  While considerably smaller than Beijing and Shanghai, Table 1 
shows that in 2010, Xiamen’s income levels were about three-fourths as high, with annual GDP per capita 
at 58,337, 75,943 and 76,074 RMB for Xiamen, Beijing and Shanghai respectively.6  Xiamen’s per capita 
GDP is similar to the mean of the 15 sub-provincial cities in China, but much higher than the 268 Di-level 
cities7.  Like Beijing and Shanghai, Xiamen is also a city with many internal migrants: only about half of 
the population of Xiamen has a permanent local residence permit (hukou); this is actually lower than the 
share in Beijing and Shanghai.  Table 1 also presents additional information on Xiamen’s labor force 
relative to other Chinese cities, taken from the 2005 Census. While a larger proportion of Xiamen’s 
workers have junior middle school or less  education than in other cities, a smaller share of them have 
high school, vocational school or college education, and a similar share of them have at least an 
undergraduate degree.  Their industry and occupation distribution is strikingly similar to other sub-
provincial cities, though they are considerably younger than workers in a typical sub-provincial or Di-
level city.  Overall, the labor market of Xiamen is probably more representative of urban China at large 
(especially the 15 sub-provincial cities) than Beijing or Shanghai. 
The source of our data is internal microdata from www.xmrc.com.cn, the official internet job 
board sponsored by the department of human resources of the city of Xiamen.  More specifically, our data 
are based on all the new job postings for the period from May 1st to October 31st 2010 on this website.  
We collected detailed information on all these job ads, as well as the characteristics of all the firms who 
posted the ads and all the workers who applied to them.  Thus, for every ad that was posted during this 
period, we know not only the characteristics of the ad, but the characteristics of each worker who 
responded to that ad via the XMRC website.  We also know which applicants were ultimately contacted 
by the firm’s HR department through the site, and we use this as our measure of workers’ success.8   
                                                 
6 In December 2010 one US dollar bought 6.65 RMB.  
7 According to the 2011 China City Statistical Yearbook, the 657 cities in China are grouped into 4 categories from an administrative 
perspective: 1) 4 municipalities directly under the jurisdiction of the central government (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjing and Chongqing); 2) 15 
sub-provincial cities; 3) 268 Di-level cities, and 4) 370 Xian-level cities. Xiamen is a sub-provincial city. Sub-provincial cities have more 
independency in economic and social development management than Di- and Xian-level cities. The leaders of sub-provincial cities are also 
of higher administrative rank. Five cities out of these 15 cities, including Xiamen, also have independent economic planning in the national 
system and the expense and revenue of these 5 cities are shared with the central government directly rather than the relevant provinces. The 
Di-level cities are of a higher administrative rank than Xian-level cities and usually contain several districts and are directly administered by 
the provincial government. Most Xian-level cities are administered by Di-level cities on behalf of the provincial government. 
8 Note that although we select job ads that have first applications no later than October 31 2010, we see all applications and contacts that 
occurred till January 13 2011, which is 74 days after the latest job ads appeared online and when lunar New Year of China was about to start 
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Because our dependent variable is the receipt of an employer contact, our analysis shares a key 
limitation of all call-back-based studies (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004):  we do not see which 
workers were actually offered jobs or were ultimately hired.  Thus, if candidates are selected from the list 
of contacts in a very different way than they are selected for contacts, our results will not be 
representative of success in getting hired.  Still, the fact that the vast majority of the applicants are 
eliminated in the selection-for-contact stage (only about 7 percent receive employer contacts—see Table 6) 
suggests that the patterns identified in our data are also the main determinant of ultimately getting the job.    
Our main statistical analysis in this paper uses a sample of 93,988 applications, submitted by 
39,732 workers to 1,219 job ads posted by 760 distinct firms. This sample was extracted from the 
universe of applications that were made during our sampling period according to the following criteria:  
First, we include only applications made by workers with either college or university education, which 
were directed to job ads that requested either college or university education.  Second, to focus on the 
transition from higher education to work, we restricted our applicants’ ages to be between 18 and 35 and 
the jobs’ experience requirement to be no more than 3 years.9  Finally, note that firms can contact workers 
they are potentially interested in hiring through a number of channels (such as telephone) other than 
through the XMRC site itself; indeed for a significant number of ads posted on XMRC we observe that no 
resumes at all are contacted by the firm during the observation period.  Since our main interest is in which 
of the applicants to a job are selected by the firm to be contacted for further interviews (and not how the 
applicant was contacted), we include in our sample only those job ads that resulted in at least one worker 
being contacted by the firm via the XMRC website.10   
Table 2 presents the sample composition with regard to job applicants. The applicants are grouped 
into four categories according to their education as well as the education requirement of the jobs to which 
they applied. As the sample sizes show, a large majority (13521/(13521+3578)) = 79% of university 
graduates applied to at least one college-level job, while only 3795/(18838+3795) = 17 % of college 
graduates applied to any university jobs.  So it appears that recent university graduates do not hesitate to 
apply for jobs they are overqualified for, but college graduates mostly avoid applying for jobs they are 
underqualified for.  Unsurprisingly, those university-educated workers who also apply to college jobs tend 
to send out more applications: the more applications one sends, the greater are the chances one of them 
will go to an education-mismatched job.  A similar pattern also applies to college workers who also apply 
                                                                                                                                                                            
and most labor market activities are stopped.  Moreover, most applications on the website either result in contacts very quickly or not at all.  
Of all applications resulted in contacts, 87.39% happened within the first 7 days after the application, and 93.19% happened within 14 days. 
Therefore, we believe it is not likely that differences in the time it takes to fill college versus university applications induce differential 
selection into our sample. 
9We also drop a small number of jobs offering a salary of more than 12,500 RMB per month and a small number of applicants with current 
salaries above that level. Applicants who do not have Chinese nationality are also excluded from the sample. 
10 A consequence of this sampling strategy is that ads which first appear on the site close to the end of our sampling period (October 31 2010) 
may be be less likely to appear in our sample because these ads are followed for 74 days, whereas our earliest job ads which first appear on 
May 1st 2010 could potentially be followed for 257 days.  Since most ads are responded to quickly or not at all, this is unlikely to induce 
much length-biased sampling.  Still, to ensure that any remaining bias does not account for our results, we created a second sample that 
consisted only of ads that resulted in a contact within 60 days of being posted; since we can follow all ads for at least 72 days this allows us 
to apply the same selection criterion regardless of when the ad was first posted. The results were very similar and are available from the 
authors on request.     
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to university jobs.  Finally, Table 2 shows, as we would expect, that the likelihood of being contacted by 
an employer increases with the number of applications a worker sends out.  
Table 3 presents the sample composition with regard to job ads. Like workers’ applications, the 
job ads are grouped into 4 categories according to their education requirement as well as the education 
qualifications of job applications received. On average, each job ad in our database received 77 
applications.  As the table shows, almost all job ads receive at least one application with mismatched 
educational credentials; indeed the small portion of job ads that only received applications from 
individuals with matched education qualification also only received relatively few  (under 40) 
applications. Table 3 also shows that as the number of applications received rises, the chances that any 
single application is contacted fall.  This illustrates the within-firm competition among applicants that 
plays a central role in many directed search models (e.g. Lang, Manove and Dickens, 2005). 
Additional details on our sample of applicants are provided in Table 4.  It shows that, compared 
with college graduates, university graduate applicants are more likely to be single, to be new graduates, 
and have less work experience. Compared to university graduates who only applied to university-level 
jobs, university graduates who applied to jobs for which they are overeducated are more likely to be 
female, married, and have more experience. This gender pattern is consistent with women being less 
(over)confident in their application decisions (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007), or perhaps rationally 
expecting to encounter discrimination in the hiring process. Comparing Table 4 to Table 1 also shows that 
applicants on XMRC are young relative to the Xiamen workforce, and much less likely to have a Xiamen 
hukou.  This is not surprising since our sample is restricted to highly-educated workers, to jobseeekers 
(indeed 26% or new graduates), and since job boards like XMRC may be an important facilitator of inter-
city migration in China.  Table 5 provides similar information on job characteristics.  It shows that there 
are many more job ads requiring college education than requiring university education. Relative to college 
jobs, university jobs are less likely to have a gender requirement, and more likely to be in firms with more 
than 300 employees.11 The distribution of firm ownership is very similar across college- and university-
level jobs, with about 70 percent of the jobs in domestic, private sector firms. 
Finally, Table 6 shows the mean of our main dependent variable (whether an application received 
a ‘call-back’ via the website) for our entire sample of applications.  Applications are broken down into 
four types based on the worker’s education level and the job’s education requirement, thus for example 
column 2 (CU) refers to applications made by college-educated workers to university-level jobs.  It shows 
that university-educated workers are more likely to receive call-backs regardless of which type of job they 
apply to,  that college-educated workers’ call-back rate drops from 7.72 to 6.07 percent when they apply 
to university-level jobs, and that university-educated workers’ call-back rate rises from 8.08 to 8.70 
percent when they apply to college-level jobs.  In the following section, we show that these simple 
comparisons survive highly detailed controls for both job and worker characteristics, and the match 
between them.   
                                                 
11 See Kuhn and Shen (2012) for an analysis of Chinese firms’ decisions to gender-target their job ads.  
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5. Econometric specification 
We use linear probability regressions on our sample of applications to study the impacts of 
education (mis)match on firms’ hiring behavior. The general form of the regression equation can be 
written as follows:   
ijjjiijijijijijijijij PoolZXMatchCUCUUUCUUUUCY   3210 )()(  
Here, the dependent variable ijY  equals one if the application (by worker i to job ad j) resulted in 
the worker being contacted by the firm’s HR department.   As noted, our main results are based on a 
sample of applications containing only two types of workers --college or university-educated—and only 
two types of job ads:  those requesting college education, or university education.  Thus we have four 
types of applications, classified by the applicant’s and job’s type; these define four indicator variables 
where, for example, UCij equals one for university-educated workers applying to college-level jobs and 
zero in all other cases.  As specified, our regression equation directly estimates three parameters of 
interest. In particular, α1  measures the difference in contact rates between the UC category and the 
omitted (CC) category, in other words α1 measures university-educated workers’ advantage over college-
educated workers when both are competing for college-level jobs.12  By the same logic, α3 measures 
college-educated workers’ advantage over university-educated workers when both are competing for 
university-level jobs.  Finally, α2 conducts a different type of comparison that applies specifically to 
university-educated workers, and is probably most relevant to the overeducation hypothesis: α2 measures 
the gain (in contact rates) experienced by a university-educated worker from applying to an education-
appropriate job (UU) instead of a job for which the worker is overqualified (UC). 
In most of our regression specifications, we use the vector ijMatch  to control for the match 
between the applicant’s qualifications and the job’s requirements on dimensions other than education.  
Specifically, ijMatch  includes dummies for whether the applicant is younger than required, older than 
required, less experienced than required, more experienced than required, of different gender than 
required, and of different “new graduate” status than required.13 
The vector iX  contains applicant-specific variables. In particular, iX  includes dummies for 
whether the applicant is female, has ever been married, has local hukou (household registration), is 
(literally) myopic, and is a new graduate.  It also contains a set of age effects (dummies for 23-25, 26-30 
and 31-35, with 18-22 as the omitted category) and experience effects (1 year, 2 years, and 3 years or 
above, with zero as the omitted category).  The vector jZ contains job- and firm-specific variables. In 
particular, we use dummies for whether the ad requests that the applicant be a new graduate, be male, or 
be female, as well as a set of dummies for the ad’s experience requirement (1 year, 2 years and 3 years, 
                                                 
12 To see this, note that when UC=1, Y = α0 + α1 and when CC=1, Y = α0.   
13 Some ads explicitly request that the applicant be a new graduate.   
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with zero as omitted category) and dummies for 7 major occupations. The firm-specific variables include 
dummies for firm size (1-10, 11-50, 51-300 and 301 or more workers) and dummies for firms’ ownership 
type.  Firm ownership categories are domestic privately-held firms, foreign firms (joint ventures, 
representative offices and foreign direct investment firms), and firms owned by Taiwan/Hong 
Kong/Macau investors, with an omitted category of domestic non-private firms, which includes state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), stock market listed firms, not for profit organizations, etc. 
Finally, in some specifications, we also include a set of variables measuring the size and 
composition of the pool of applications that are competing for the same job with the current application, 
Poolj. The key variable here is the total number of applications received for the job.  To allow competing 
applications from mismatched workers to have different effects from matched workers’ applications, we 
also include two additional variables.  One of these equals the number of university-educated applicants if 
the job requires college education (and zero otherwise).  It captures the effect of replacing one application 
that matches the job’s requirements (college) with a non-matching (university) applicant. The remaining 
variable equals the number of college-educated applicants if the job requires university education (and 
zero otherwise); it is interpreted analogously. 
Despite our rich set of covariates, it of course remains possible that our samples of university- 
versus college-educated workers differs in unobservable ways that affects their employment probability.  
One possibility, for example, is that workers who choose to look for work online are negatively selected 
(Kuhn and Skuterud 2004), and that this selection is more pronounced for, say, university- versus college-
educated workers.  While we cannot think of any reasons why selection into Internet search differs for 
these two groups, we caution that such differential selection could affect our results.  Accordingly, our 
results should be interpreted as applying to employers’ differential treatment of university- versus college-
educated workers who post their resumes on XMRC.  While selection onto this site might differ by 
worker type making it difficult to generalize to the entire labor market, our results clearly show that 
employers do not ‘shy away’ from university-educated workers when they apply to jobs they are 
overqualified for on this site. 
6. Results: University versus College Graduates 
Table 7 presents our main results for university versus college graduates in two panels. All 
specifications estimate the impact of the three key indicators of education (mis)match, and Panel B 
mimics Panel A but with the Poolj variables added.  Moving across the Table from column 1 to 4, we add 
matching variables (on characteristics other than education), applicant’s variables, and job variables 
sequentially to the regression. According to the estimate of α1 in row 1, university-educated workers 
applying to college-level jobs are more likely to be contacted by the employer than college-educated 
workers applying for the same job. Based on the most saturated specification in column 4, university-
educated workers’ advantage in the competition for college-level jobs is 0.86 percentage points. This is a 
sizable effect since, according to Table 7; the mean contact rate for college-educated workers applying to 
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education-appropriate jobs is 7.72 percent.  In other words, university-educated workers have about an 
(.86/7.72) = 11 percent advantage over college-educated workers in the competition for college-level jobs.  
Perhaps less surprisingly, our estimates of α3 show that university-educated workers also have an 
advantage over college-educated workers in the competition for university-level jobs.  At between 1.3 and 
2.0 percentage points, this advantage is larger than their advantage in the competition for lower-level jobs. 
Estimates of α2, which address the overeducation hypothesis most directly, show (perhaps 
surprisingly) that university-educated workers are less likely to be contacted by firms when they apply for 
education-matched jobs than for college-level jobs.  Panel B of Table 7 shows that the above results for α1, 
α2, and α3 are robust to adding controls for the size and mix of the applicant pool a resume is competing 
with.  The coefficients on the education-matching variables are essentially unchanged, suggesting that –
while these applicant pool effects certainly matter for hiring rates-- their effects are largely orthogonal to 
whether the current application is education-matched.14 
In sum, Table 7 shows that (1) that firms certainly do consider education mismatched applications 
(the contact rate does not drop to zero when the applicant is mismatched on education); (2) in the 
competition for jobs requiring a given amount of education, Chinese employers tend to favor workers 
with more education, even when that education is more than the firm requested in its job ad; and (3) there 
is no support for the overeducation hypothesis as an explanation for why young university-educated 
workers have difficulty finding jobs:  university-educated workers are more likely to be short-listed when 
they apply for jobs they are overqualified for than when they apply for education-appropriate jobs. 
To learn more about the impacts of education mismatch on firms’ hiring decisions, we interacted 
the 4 types of education (mis)match with other application characteristics one by one.  Overall, the 
patterns found in Table 7 were very stable across subgroups with the following exceptions:  First, the 
hiring advantage associated with overeducation is not present when the applicant is older than required, 
when the job requires new graduates, or when the job specifically requests male applicants.  Second, the 
impacts of education mismatch are very different across firms of different ownership types.  This is 
shown in Table 8, which replicates specification (4) of Table 7 with interactions between firm type and 
the education matching variables.  Unsurprisingly, the results for private domestic firms in column 3 of 
Table 8 mirror those in Table 7, since these firms constitute a large majority of our sample.  Other types 
of firms, however, behave quite differently; probably the most salient difference is that our estimate of α1 
is negative for foreign-owned firms.  In this sense, foreign-owned firms behave in a way that is more 
consistent with their stated education requirement in job ads:  university-educated workers actually do 
worse than college-educated workers in the competition for college-level jobs.  The other large difference 
across firm types in Table 8 is the large positive value of α1 in “other” firm ownership category, which 
includes SOEs.  While this seems to indicate that SOEs have a strong preference for university-educated 
                                                 
14 In all cases, the applicant pool variables show that a larger pool of competing applications reduces one’s chances of being contacted by the 
employer; these effects are highly statistically significant. For both job types, the impacts of additional applications from education-
mismatched candidates are very different across firms of different ownership types.   
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workers even when they advertise for college-educated workers, we caution that this is a small category 
and contains employer types other than SOEs. 
Why do firms with different ownership behave so differently in their recruiting patterns in terms 
of education (mis)match?  One possibility is that mismatch is more costly to non-local firms, perhaps 
because they face higher hiring costs. This would make it more difficult to replace an overeducated 
worker who stays for a short period, then moves on to a better job elsewhere.  The same would apply if 
non-local firms engage in more training, including such activities as teaching a foreign corporate culture 
and language of business. Further research on the causes of these behavioral differences might shed 
interesting light on differences in explicit and implicit employment contracts between domestic Chinese 
and international firms. 
7. Results: College versus Technical School Graduates 
To see if our results on overqualification extend to other education levels, we duplicated the 
regressions in Tables 7 and 8 for a less-educated sample of jobs and workers.  Specifically, we focused on 
firms’ choices between college graduates and technical school graduates in a sample of jobs requiring one 
of these two education levels. Here, we might expect firms seeking tech school graduates to be more 
likely to avoid overqualified college-educated workers than in our main analysis, for two reasons.  First, 
in contrast to university graduates who have one more year of education than college graduates, college 
graduates have three more years of education than tech school graduates.  So in a sense college grads 
applying to tech school jobs are more overqualified than university grads applying to college-level jobs.  
Second, technical schools provide specific vocational preparation, which might make them better 
prepared for certain jobs than college grads.  Essentially, college and technical school graduates may not 
be as substitutable as university and college graduates from the employer’s perspective. 
Regression results for the case of competition between technical- and high-school graduates are 
presented in Tables 9 and 10; the specifications for these Tables exactly mimic those of Tables 7 and 8.  
The results show, first of all, that in contrast to university graduates competing for college jobs, college 
grads do have a significant disadvantage in competing for tech-school jobs:  all our estimates of α1 are 
negative and highly statistically significant.  Specifically, college applicants to tech-school jobs are about 
1.7 percentage points less likely to be contacted than tech-school applicants to those jobs. Perhaps even 
more surprisingly, our estimates of α3 indicate that tech school grads experience no disadvantage relative 
to college grads when applying to jobs requesting college education.   Finally, our most direct test of the 
overeducation hypothesis (α2) shows that college-educated workers gain a great deal from directing their 
applications to jobs requesting a college education, relative to a lower level of education.  In the 
specifications without applicant pool controls, these workers are estimated to experience a 1.5 percentage 
point drop in the probability of being contacted by the employer when they apply to tech school jobs.  In 
the presence of application pool controls, this loss rises to about 3.0 percentage points, which is a 
reduction (relative to this group’s mean contact rate) of about 40 percent.  Thus, Chinese employers do 
12 
 
avoid overqualified workers in this context, where the education gap is larger and the less-educated group 
might have specific vocational skills not possessed by the group with higher education. 
Does firms’ treatment of overqualified college graduates vary with their ownership type, as it did 
for university graduates?  Table 10 shows that firm ownership matters in this context as well.  While the 
patterns for domestic, private-sector firms again mirror the aggregate results as expected, we now see 
large increases in the magnitude of α2 in foreign firms. College-educated workers applying to foreign 
firms seem to do much better when the job requests college school than tech school, with an estimated 
differential success rate of four or five percentage points.  A similar pattern holds for Taiwan/Hong 
Kong/Macau-based firms. A possible explanation for this pattern, again, is higher recruitment and training 
costs among non-local firms:  these firms might especially want to avoid hiring college-educated workers 
into jobs they are overqualified for if the costs of replacing those workers is high. 
In sum, our analysis of job competition at lower skill levels reveals that college graduates face a 
significant disadvantage in competing for tech-school jobs, while technical-school graduates have no 
disadvantage in competing for college jobs.  The contrast between these results and our results for the 
competition between university and college graduates illustrates the importance of considering the 
specific educational context in any analysis of over- or underqualification, not just the modern Chinese 
context.      
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has used online job board micro data to study the relative performance of university- 
and college-educated workers in the competition for jobs in urban China. Our results show that university 
graduates have an advantage over college graduates, not only in the competition for university-level jobs, 
but also in the competition for college-level jobs. Further, university-educated workers are more likely to 
be contacted by employers when applying to jobs they are overqualified for than when applying to jobs 
that match their educational credentials.  Together, these results contradict the ‘overeducation hypothesis’ 
which posits that having more education than a job demands can reduce a worker’s chances of being 
offered the job if he or she applies for it.  The one exception to this in the competition between university 
and college graduates is for foreign firms; these firms seem to avoid hiring overqualified workers, which 
may indicate that they face greater labor market frictions, whether in the form of hiring costs or firm-
specific training levels.   
We also conduct a parallel analysis of the competition between college- and technical-school 
graduates, finding that in this competition, college-educated workers do fare quite poorly when applying 
to jobs they are overqualified for.  A possible explanation is the greater amount of mismatch between 
these two education levels:  not only do college graduates have three more years of education than 
technical school graduates (in contrast to one year of mismatch between university and college graduates), 
but technical school grads may have specific vocational skills that college grads lack.  Combined with our 
main analysis, these results highlight the difficult situation facing recent college graduates in China:  they 
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seem to fare poorly when competing against workers who are better-educated than they are, and when 
competing against the much-less-educated technical school graduates.  In short, this middle group may 
bear the main burden of adjustment to China’s recent massive expansion of higher education.  
In addition to shedding some light on recent developments in the Chinese labor market, our results 
also contribute to a more general literature on the effects of overqualification.  While a number of other 
authors have studied the prevalence and behavior of persons currently working in jobs they are 
overqualified for, to our knowledge no one has studied how overqualified workers ‘stack up’ relative to 
other candidates in the competition for jobs, especially using recruiting stage micro data.  Our findings, 
that university-educated workers do well when applying for jobs they are overqualified for, but college-
educated workers do not, suggest that the effects of overqualification may depend critically on the nature 
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Table 1:  Characteristics of Xiamen and Comparison cities, 2010     
  
 
Notes to Table 1:   n/a denotes statistics are not available. 
 
1. City characteristics refer to 2010.  GDP per capita data and year-end population for Beijing and Shanghai are 
from CEIC Data (2012), year-end population for Xiamen is from 2011 Yearbook of Xiamen Special Economic 
Zone, other data are from 2011 China City Statistical Yearbook. 
 
2. In December 2010 one US dollar bought 6.65 RMB; 
 
3. This refers to ChangZhuRenKou, including all individuals regardless of hukou status; 
 
4. Workforce characteristics refer to 2005.  They are authors’ calculations from the 1% National Population Sample 
Survey, conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics. We select non-disabled, non-student individuals with 
age from 18 to 60 living in the urban area and employed as employees. All statistics are constructed using census 
weights. Means for the 15 sub-provincial cities and 268 Di-level cities are simple averages across cities.  
 






City Characteristics:1      
  GDP per capita in urban area (RMB)2  58,337 75,943 76,074 64,255 33,360 
  Population (1,000s)3  3,531 19,619 23,027 n/a n/a 
  Local Hukou share of population (%) 50.6 63.8 61.1 n/a n/a 
Workforce Characteristics (%):4      
  Education      
   Junior middle school or below 46.9 26.1 40.1 39.5 39.0 
   High school 26.6 30.0 30.4 28.7 30.6 
   Vocational school or college 12.7 19.9 14.8 17.2 20.1 
   Undergraduate or more 13.8 24.0 14.7 14.7 10.3 
Industry  
   Primary, Manufacturing and Utility 43.1 20.3 38.8 41.0 36.5 
   Construction and Transportation 12.9 14.2 13.2 11.9 14.2 
   IT and Communication 2.5 4.3 2.5 1.8 1.4 
   Wholesale/Retail, Hospitality etc.  13.7 22.3 18.5 15.6 11.7 
   Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 8.2 12.2 9.7 6.8 5.7 
   R&D and Consulting 2.8 5.4 3.5 3.0 2.6 
   Health, Education and Welfare 10.4 13.8 10.0 12.6 14.5 
   Public and Social Management  6.5 7.3 3.9 7.2 13.4 
Occupation      
   Senior Management 3.6 5.2 3.5 2.7 1.6 
   Professional and Technical 16.2 27.8 18.7 21.5 23.8 
   Sales and Service Occupations 20.1 27.3 25.7 21.1 17.6 
   Production and Construction  41.7 22.6 34.8 38.4 37.7 
   Other 18.5 17.1 17.3 16.3 19.3 
Age      
   30 or below 50.7 33.6 36.5 35.9 28.2 
   31-40 29.3 29.8 25.6 32.0 38.2 
   41-50 16.5 28.2 27.0 24.2 25.4 





Table 2: Distribution of Workers’ Number of Applications Sent  





College  University  All Jobs 
Did the worker apply ONLY to jobs 
matching his/her education level? 
Yes No Yes No 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of applicants 18,838 3,795 3,578 13,521 39,732 































Average number of applications sent 1.91 4.03 1.21 2.84 2.37 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the percent of applicants that received any contacts.  
 
Table 3: Distribution of Jobs’ Number of Applications Received 




Job’s education requirement: 
 
College Jobs University Jobs All Jobs 
Did the ad receive applications ONLY 
from workers with exactly the 
required education?  
Yes No Yes No 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of jobs 22 1,002 7 188 1,219 

























Average number of applications received 5.18 76.68 9.29 90.31 77.10 
 








College  University  
All 
Workers
Did the worker apply ONLY to jobs matching 
his/her education level? 
Yes No Yes No 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Age      
18-22 35% 30% 20% 17% 27% 
23-25 37% 39% 56% 56% 45% 
26-30 22% 25% 21% 23% 23% 
31-35 6% 6% 3% 4% 5% 
 Work experience (years)      
none  25% 20% 42% 37% 30% 
1  20% 20% 21% 22% 21% 
2  15% 16% 13% 15% 15% 
3 or more  40% 44% 24% 26% 34% 
 Other characteristics      
Female 57% 61% 47% 55% 56% 
Married 16% 17% 9% 11% 14% 
Local Hukou 8% 8% 10% 9% 9% 
Myopic 32% 34% 51% 47% 39% 
New Graduate 22% 16% 38% 32% 26% 
 Number of workers 18,838 3,795 3,578 13,521 39,732 




Table 5: Summary Statistics of Jobs 
 
Jobs’ education requirement: College  University  All jobs 
Did the ad receive applications 
ONLY from workers with exactly the 
required education? 
Yes No Yes No 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Require New Graduate? 5% 4% 0% 9% 5% 
Gender requirement      
None stated  59% 64% 86% 70% 65% 
Male only 9% 9% 0% 12% 9% 
Female only 32% 27% 14% 19% 26% 
Working experience requirement      
No 41% 45% 57% 49% 46% 
1 year 14% 21% 14% 24% 21% 
2 years 14% 20% 29% 12% 19% 
3 years 32% 14% 0% 15% 14% 
Occupation      
Sales 18% 15% 0% 13% 14% 
international trade 5% 7% 0% 13% 8% 
Software 18% 10% 0% 11% 10% 
Finance 5% 9% 0% 9% 9% 
administrative 18% 26% 29% 20% 25% 
professional service 18% 7% 43% 12% 8% 
manufacture 18% 24% 29% 21% 24% 
Others 0% 1% 0% 2% 1% 
Firm ownership      
Foreign firms 18% 15% 0% 16% 15% 
Domestic private firms 73% 70% 71% 70% 70% 
Taiwan/HK/Macau firms 9% 9% 14% 8% 9% 
Other 0% 6% 14% 6% 6% 
# of employees of the firm      
1-10 18% 10% 29% 9% 10% 
11-50 27% 34% 43% 35% 34% 
51-300 45% 39% 0% 30% 38% 
>300 9% 17% 29% 26% 18% 
  Number of jobs 22 1,002 7 188 1,219 




Table 6: Contact Rates of Applications, by Type  
Worker’s education level:  College  University  










# of applications 46,578 4,708 30,366 12,336 
Average # applications per job  45.62 25.04 30.31 63.92 






Table 7: Regression Results for College versus University Graduates  
A:  WITHOUT APPLICATION POOL CONTROLS (1) (2) (3) (4) 
α1:  University-educated workers’ advantage over college-educated 









α2:  University-educated workers’ gain from applying to education- 









α3: College-educated workers’ advantage over university-educated  









Other Match Characteristics (Matchij)  Yes Yes Yes 
Applicant Characteristics (Xi)   Yes Yes 
Job and Firm Characteristics (Zj)    Yes 
R2 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.011 
B: WITH APPLICATION POOL CONTROLS     
α1:  University-educated workers’ advantage over college-educated 









α2:  University-educated workers’ gain from applying to education- 









α3: College-educated workers’ advantage over university-educated  









Size and Mix of Applicant Pool  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Match Characteristics (Matchij)  Yes Yes Yes 
Applicant Characteristics (Xi)   Yes Yes 
Job and Firm Characteristics (Zj)    Yes 
R2 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.020 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All regressions are estimated as linear probability models and have 93,988 
observations.  
Matchij includes dummies for whether the applicant is younger than required, older than required, less experienced than 
required, more experienced than required, of different gender than required, and of different “new graduate” status than 
required. 
Xi includes dummies for whether the applicant is female, has ever been married, has local hukou (household registration), is 
(literally) myopic, and is a new graduate.  It also contains a set of age effects (dummies for 23-25, 26-30 and 31-35, with 18-22 
as the omitted category) and experience effects (1 year, 2 years, and 3 years or above, with zero as the omitted category).  
Zj includes dummies for whether the ad requests that the applicant be a new graduate, be male, or be female, as well as a set of 
dummies for the ad’s experience requirement and dummies for 7 major occupations.  Zj  also includeds dummies for firm size 
(1-10, 11-50, 51-300 and 301 or more workers) and dummies for firms’ ownership type.   
Application pool controls are the total number of applications received for the job, plus a pair of variables that allows 




Table 8: College versus University Graduate Results with Firm Ownership Interactions  
 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All coefficients in Panel A are from a single regression, specified according to 
column 4 in panel A of Table 7. All regressions are estimated as linear probability models and have 93,988 observations. The 
only difference is that the education-matching coefficients are interacted with firm ownership type.  Panel B adds controls for 
the size and mix of the applicant pool to this regression.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 







α1:  University-educated workers’ advantage over college-educated 









α2:  University-educated workers’ gain from applying to education- 









α3: College-educated workers’ advantage over university-educated  










     
B:  WITH APPLICATION POOL CONTROLS 
 
 
   
α1:  University-educated workers’ advantage over college-educated  









α2:  University-educated workers’ gain from applying to education- 









α3: College-educated workers’ advantage over university-educated 













Table 9: Regression Results for Technical School versus College Graduates  
A:  WITHOUT APPLICATION POOL CONTROLS (1) (2) (3) (4) 
α1:  College-educated workers’ advantage over tech school-educated









α2:  College-educated workers’ gain from applying to education- 









α3: Tech school-educated workers’ advantage over college-educated 









Other Match Characteristics (Matchij)  Yes Yes Yes 
Applicant Characteristics (Xi)   Yes Yes 
Job and Firm Characteristics (Zj)    Yes 
R2 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 
B: WITH APPLICATION POOL CONTROLS     
α1:  College-educated workers’ advantage over tech school-educated









α2:  College-educated workers’ gain from applying to education- 









α3: Tech school-educated workers’ advantage over college-educated 









Size and Mix of Applicant Pool  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Match Characteristics (Matchij)  Yes Yes Yes 
Applicant Characteristics (Xi)   Yes Yes 
Job and Firm Characteristics (Zj)    Yes 
R2 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.024 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All regressions are estimated as linear probability models and have 75,393 
observations.   See Table 7 for detailed regression specifications.  
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Table 10: Technical School versus College Graduates Results with Firm Ownership Interactions  
 
 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All coefficients in Panel A are from a single regression, specified according to 
column 4 in panel A of Table 9. All regressions are estimated as linear probability models and have 75,393 observations. The 
only difference is that the education-matching coefficients are interacted with firm ownership type.  Panel B adds controls for 
the size and mix of the applicant pool to this regression.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 







α1:  College-educated workers’ advantage over tech school-educated 









α2:  College-educated workers’ gain from applying to education- 









α3: Tech school-educated workers’ advantage over college-educated  










     
B:  WITH APPLICATION POOL CONTROLS 
 
 
   
α1:  College-educated workers’ advantage over tech school-educated 









α2:  College-educated workers’ gain from applying to education- 









α3: Tech school-educated workers’ advantage over college-educated  








































Note:  Figures are in millions.  
Source: China Education Yearbook, China Education Statistical Yearbook and China Statistical Yearbook of various years. 
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Year
university college tech school
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Note: Figures are in millions The numbers of technical school graduates correspond to the total of graduates from 
“ZhongDengZhuanYeXueXiao (Regular Specialized Secondary Schools)”, “JiGongXueXiao (Technical Schools)”, and “ZhiYeZhongXue 
(Secondary Vocational Schools)”.  


































Note: Figures are in thousands.  The lighter and thicker lines are for jobseekers at corresponding education levels, and the darker and thinner 
lines are for vacancies at corresponding education levels. 
Source: CEIC(2012).  High school statistics include technical school.  Separate statistics for technical school, which became available in 
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Year
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college university
